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a b s t r a c t
In view of the intractability of finding a Nash equilibrium, it is important to understand the
limits of approximation in this context. A subexponential approximation scheme is known
[Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta, Playing large games using simple
strategies, in: EC, 2003], and no approximation better than 14 is possible by any algorithm
that examines equilibria involving fewer than log n strategies [Ingo Althöfer, On sparse
approximations to randomized strategies and convex combinations, Linear Algebra and
its Applications (1994) 199]. We give a simple, linear-time algorithm examining just two
strategies per player and resulting in a 12 -approximate Nash equilibrium in any 2-player
game. For themore demanding notion of approximatelywell supported Nash equilibrium due
to [Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul W. Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou, The complexity
of computing a Nash equilibrium, SIAM Journal on Computing (in press) Preliminary
version appeared in STOC (2006)] no nontrivial bound is known;we show that the problem
can be reduced to the case of win-lose games (games with all utilities 0 or 1), and that an
approximation of 56 is possible, contingent upon a graph-theoretic conjecture.
Subsequent work extends the 14 impossibility result of Ingo Althöfer’s paper, as
mentioned above, to 12 [Tomás Feder, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi, Approximating
nash equilibria using small-support strategies, in: EC, 2007], making our 12 -approximate
Nash equilibrium algorithm optimal among the algorithms that only consider mixed
strategies of sublogarithmic size support. Moreover, techniques similar to our techniques
for approximately well supported Nash equilibria are used in [Spyros Kontogiannis,
Paul G. Spirakis, Efficient algorithms for constant well supported approximate equilibria
in bimatrix games, in: ICALP, 2007] for obtaining an efficient algorithm for 0.658-
approximately well supported Nash equilibria, unconditionally.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since it was shown that finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete [8], even for 2-player normal form games [3],
the question of approximate Nash equilibrium emerged as the central remaining open problem in the area of equilibrium
computation. Since scaling the utilities of a player by any positive factor, and applying any additive constant, results in
an equilibrium-equivalent game, it is quite standard to assume that all utilities have been normalized to be between 0
and 1. A set of mixed strategies is then an -approximate Nash equilibrium, where  > 0, if, for each player, all strategies
have expected payoff that is at most  more than the expected payoff of the given strategy. Clearly, any mixed strategy
combination is a 1-approximate Nash equilibrium, and it is quite straightforward to find a 34 -approximate Nash equilibrium
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of a two-player game by examining all pairs ofmixed strategieswith supports of size two. In fact, [15] provides a scheme that
yields, for every  > 0, in time polynomial in the size of the game and 1

, a 2++λ4 -approximate Nash equilibrium, where λ
is the minimum, among all Nash equilibria, expected payoff of either player. [18] (building on [1,19]) showed that, for every
 > 0, an -approximate Nash equilibrium can be found in time nO
(
log n
2
)
by examining all supports of size O
(
log n
2
)
. It was
pointed out in [1] that, even for zero-sum games, no algorithm that examines supports smaller than about log n can achieve
an approximation better than 14 . Can this gap between
1
4 and
3
4 be bridged by looking at small supports? And how can the
barrier of 14 be broken in polynomial time?
In this note, we concentrate on 2-player games. We point out that a straightforward algorithm, looking at just three
strategies in total, achieves a 12 -approximate Nash equilibrium. The algorithm is very intuitive: for any strategy i of the row
player, let j be the best response of the column player, and let k be the best response of the row player to j. Then the row
player plays an equal mixture of i and k, while the column player plays j. The proof of 12 -approximation is rather immediate.
We also examine a more sophisticated concept of approximation due to [13,8], called -approximately well supported
Nash equilibrium, which does not allow in the support strategies that are suboptimal by more than . For this concept,
no approximation constant better than 1 is known. We show that the problem is reduced — albeit with a loss in the
approximation ratio— to the case inwhich all utilities are either zero or one (this is often called the ‘‘win-lose case’’).We also
prove that, assuming awell-studied and plausible graph-theoretic conjecture, in win-lose games there is a 23 -approximately
well supported Nash equilibriumwith supports of size at most three (and of course it can be found in polynomial time). This
yields a 56 -approximately well supported Nash equilibrium for any game.
Following the first presentation of our results [9], there have been several improvements.We summarize the subsequent
work in Section 5.
2. Definitions
We consider normal form games between two players, the row player and the column player, each with n strategies at
his disposal. The game is defined by two n× n payoff matrices, R for the row player, and C for the column player. The pure
strategies of the row player correspond to the n rows, and the pure strategies of the column player correspond to the n
columns. If the row player plays row i and the column player plays column j, then the row player receives a payoff of Rij and
the column player gets Cij. Payoffs are extended linearly to pairs of mixed strategies — if the row player plays a probability
distribution x over the rows, and the column player plays a distribution y over the columns, then the row player gets a payoff
of xTRy and the column player gets a payoff of xTCy.
A Nash equilibrium, in this setting, is a pair of mixed strategies, x∗ for the row player and y∗ for the column player, such
that neither player has an incentive to unilaterally defect. Note that, by linearity, the best defection is to a pure strategy. Let
ei denote the vector with a 1 at the ith coordinate and 0 elsewhere. A pair of mixed strategies (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium if
∀i = 1..n, eTi Ry∗ ≤ x∗TRy∗
∀i = 1..n, x∗TCei ≤ x∗TCy∗.
It can be easily shown that every pair of equilibrium strategies of a game remains an equilibrium upon multiplying all
the entries of a payoff matrix by a constant, and upon adding the same constant to each entry. We shall therefore assume
that the entries of both payoff matrices R and C are between 0 and 1.
For  > 0, we define an -approximate Nash equilibrium to be a pair of mixed strategies x∗ for the row player and y∗ for
the column player, so that the incentive to unilaterally deviate is at most , that is
∀i = 1..n, eTi Ry∗ ≤ x∗TRy∗ + 
∀i = 1..n, x∗TCei ≤ x∗TCy∗ + .
Given that we have normalized all the payoff entries to [0, 1], the additive notion of approximation that we consider is
reasonable, and it is the standard choice in the literature (see, for example, [21]).
A stronger notion of approximation was introduced in [13,8]: for  > 0, an -approximately well supported Nash
equilibrium, or -Nash equilibrium, is a pair of mixed strategies, x∗ for the row player and y∗ for the column player, so that a
player plays only approximately best-response pure strategies with non-zero probability, that is
∀i : x∗i > 0⇒ eTi Ry∗ ≥ eTj Ry∗ − , ∀j
∀i : y∗i > 0⇒ x∗TCei ≥ x∗TCej − , ∀j.
If only the first set of inequalities holds, we say that x∗ is -well supported against y∗; we also say that every pure strategy
in the support of x∗ is -well supported against y∗. A similar definition holds for the second set of inequalities, this time for y∗
against x∗. The -Nash equilibrium defines a stronger notion of approximation, in the sense that every -Nash equilibrium
is also an -approximate Nash equilibrium, but the converse need not be true. Nevertheless, the following lemma from [8]
shows that there does exist a tight relationship between the two:
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Lemma 2.1 ([8]). Given an -approximate Nash equilibrium of a game (R, C) we can compute in polynomial time a
√
(
√
 +
1+ 4U)-approximately well supported Nash equilibrium, where U is the maximum entry in the payoff matrices R and C.
In this paper, we showhow to find a 1/2-approximate Nash equilibrium. For  = 1/2, the application of the above lemma
does not help in getting a non-trivial (i.e. better than 1-approximate) well supported equilibrium. Thus, we also describe
algorithms for directly finding non-trivial well supported equilibria.
3. A simple algorithm
Weprovide, here, a simpleway of computing a 12 -approximateNash equilibrium: pick an arbitrary row for the rowplayer,
say row i. Let j ∈ argmaxj′ Cij′ . Let k ∈ argmaxk′ Rk′j. Thus, j is a best-response column for the column player to the row i,
and k is a best-response row for the row player to the column j.
The approximate equilibrium is then x∗ = 12 ei+ 12 ek and y∗ = ej, i.e., the row player plays row i or row kwith probability
1
2 each, while the column player plays column jwith probability 1.
Theorem 3.1. The strategy pair (x∗, y∗) is a 12 -approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The row player’s payoff under (x∗, y∗) is x∗TRy∗ = 12Rij + 12Rkj. By construction, one of his best responses to y∗ is to
play the pure strategy on row k, which gives a payoff of Rkj. Hence, his incentive to defect is equal to the difference:
Rkj −
(
1
2
Rij + 12Rkj
)
= 1
2
Rkj − 12Rij ≤
1
2
Rkj ≤ 12 .
The column player’s payoff under (x∗, y∗) is x∗TCy∗ = 12Cij+ 12Ckj. Let j′ be a best pure strategy response of the column player
to x∗: this strategy gives the column player a value of 12Cij′ + 12Ckj′ , hence her incentive to defect is equal to the difference:(
1
2
Cij′ + 12Ckj′
)
−
(
1
2
Cij + 12Ckj
)
= 1
2
(Cij′ − Cij)+ 12 (Ckj′ − Ckj)
≤ 0+ 1
2
(Ckj′ − Ckj)
≤ 1
2
.
Here the first inequality follows from the fact that column j was a best response to row i, by the first step of the
construction. 
4. Well supported Nash equilibria
The algorithm of the previous section yields equilibria that are, in the worst case, as bad as 1-approximately well
supported (when Rij = 0 and Rkj = 1). In this section we address the harder computational problem of finding -
approximately well supported equilibria for  < 1.
Our construction has two components. In the first, we transform the given 2-player game into a new game by rearranging
and potentially discarding or duplicating some of the columns of the original game. The transformation will be such that
well supported equilibria in the new game can bemapped back to well supported equilibria of the original game; moreover,
themappingwill result in some sort of decorrelation of the players, in the sense that computation of well supported equilibria
in the decorrelated game can be carried out by looking at the row player only. The second part of the construction relies
in mapping the original game into a win-lose game (a game with 0/1 payoffs) and computing equilibria of the latter. The
mapping will guarantee that well supportedness of equilibria is preserved, albeit with some larger approximation.
4.1. Player decorrelation
Let (R, C) be a 2-player game, where the set of strategies of both players is [n] := {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 4.1. A mapping f : [n] → [n] is a best response mapping for the column player if, for every i ∈ [n],
Cif (i) = max
j
Cij.
Definition 4.2 (Decorrelation Transformation). The decorrelated game (Rf , C f ) corresponding to the best response mapping
f is defined as follows
∀i, j ∈ [n] : Rfij = Rif (j)
C fij = Cif (j).
1584 C. Daskalakis et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 1581–1588
In other words, column j of Rf (resp. C f ) is a copy of column f (j) of R (resp. C). Note that the decorrelation transformation
need not be a permutation of the columns of the original game. Some columns of the original gamemay verywell be dropped
and others duplicated. So, it is not true, in general, that (exact) Nash equilibria of the decorrelated game can be mapped to
Nash equilibria of the original game. However, some specially structured approximately well supported equilibria of the
decorrelated game can be mapped to approximately well supported equilibria of the original game, as specified by the
following lemmas.
In the following discussion, we assume that we have fixed a best response mapping f for the column player and that the
corresponding decorrelated game is (Rf , C f ). Also, if S ⊆ [n], we denote by∆(S) the set of probability distributions over the
set S. Moreover, if x ∈ ∆(S), we denote by supp(x) 4= {i ∈ [n]|x(i) > 0}, the support of x.
Lemma 4.3. In the game (Rf , C f ), for all sets S ⊆ [n], every strategy of the column player in S is |S|−1|S| -well supported against the
following strategy x∗ of the row player: Define S ′ =
{
i ∈ S|C fii = 0
}
.
• if S ′ 6= ∅, then x∗ is the uniform distribution over S ′
• if S ′ = ∅, then
x∗(i) =
{
1
Z
1
C fii
, if i ∈ S
0, otherwise
where Z =∑i∈S 1C fii is a normalizing constant.
Proof. Suppose that S ′ 6= ∅. By the definition of S ′, it follows that ∀i ∈ S ′, j ∈ [n], C fij = 0. Therefore, for all j ∈ [n],
x∗TC f ej = 0,
which proves the claim.
The proof for the S ′ = ∅ case is based on the following observations.
• ∀j ∈ S:
x∗TC f ej ≥ x∗(j)C fjj =
1
Z
1
C fjj
C fjj =
1
Z
.
• ∀j ∈ [n]:
x∗TC f ej = 1Z
∑
i∈S
1
C fii
C fij ≤
1
Z
∑
i∈S
1
C fii
C fii =
|S|
Z
.
• Z =∑i∈S 1C fii ≥ |S| because every entry of C f is at most 1.
Therefore, ∀j1 ∈ S, j2 ∈ [n],
x∗TC f ej2 − x∗TC f ej1 ≤
|S| − 1
Z
≤ |S| − 1|S| ,
which completes the claim. 
The following lemma is an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.4 (Player Decorrelation). In the game (Rf , C f ), if there exists a set S ⊆ [n] and a mixed strategy y∗ ∈ ∆(S) for the
column player such that each of the row player’s strategies in S is |S|−1|S| -well supported against the distribution y
∗, then there
exists a strategy x∗ ∈ ∆(S) for the row player, of the form specified in the statement of Lemma 4.3, so that the pair (x∗, y∗) is an
|S|−1
|S| -approximately well supported Nash equilibrium.
The next lemma describes how well supported equilibria in the games (R, C) and (Rf , C f ) are related.
Lemma 4.5. ∀S ⊆ [n], if the pair (x∗, y∗), where x∗ is defined as in the statement of Lemma 4.3 and y∗ is any distribution over S,
constitutes an |S|−1|S| -approximately well supported Nash equilibrium for the game (R
f , C f ), then the pair of distributions (x∗, y′)
is an |S|−1|S| -approximately well supported Nash equilibrium for the game (R, C), where y
′ is the distribution, defined as follows
y′(i) =
∑
j∈S
y∗(j)Xf (j)=i, ∀i ∈ [n],
whereXf (j)=i is the indicator function of the condition ‘‘f (j) = i’’.
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Proof. We have to verify that the pair of distributions (x∗, y′) satisfies the conditions of well supportedness for the row and
column player in the game (R, C).
Row player:We show that the strategies y∗ and y′ of the column player give to every pure strategy of the row player the
same payoff in the two games. And, since the support of the row player stays the same set S in the two games, the fact that
the strategy of the row player is approximately well supported in the game (Rf , C f ) guarantees that the strategy of the row
player will be approximately well supported in the game (R, C) as well.
∀i ∈ [n] : eTi Ry′ =
n∑
k=1
Rik · y′(k)
=
n∑
k=1
Rik ·
∑
j∈S
y∗(j)Xf (j)=k
=
∑
j∈S
y∗(j)
n∑
k=1
Rik ·Xf (j)=k
=
∑
j∈S
y∗(j)Rif (j)
=
∑
j∈S
y∗(j)Rfij = eTi Rf y∗.
Column player: As in the proof of Lemma 4.3, the analysis proceeds by distinguishing the cases S ′ 6= ∅ and S ′ = ∅. The
case S ′ 6= ∅ is easy, because, in this regime, it must hold that ∀i ∈ S ′, j ∈ [n], C fij = 0 which implies that, also, Cij = 0,
∀i ∈ S ′, j ∈ [n]. And since x∗ has support S ′ we see that the column player’s strategy is 0-well supported against x∗.
So it is enough to deal with the S ′ = ∅ case. The support of y′ is clearly the set S ′′ = {j|∃i ∈ S such that f (i) = j}.
Moreover, observe the following:
∀j ∈ S ′′ : x∗TCej =
∑
i∈S
x∗(i)Cij
≥
∑
i∈S s.t.
f (i)=j
x∗(i)Cif (i)
=
∑
i∈S s.t.
f (i)=j
x∗(i)C fii ≥
1
Z
.
The final inequality holds because there is at least one summand, since j ∈ S ′′. On the other hand,
∀j /∈ S ′′ : x∗TCej =
∑
i∈S
x∗(i)Cij
≤
∑
i∈S
x∗(i)Cif (i)
=
∑
i∈S
x∗(i)C fii
=
∑
i∈S
1
Z
1
C fii
C fii
= |S|
Z
.
Moreover, as we argued in the proof of Lemma 4.3, |S|Z − 1Z ≤ |S|−1|S| . This completes the proof, since the strategy of the column
player is, thus, also approximately well supported. 
4.2. Reduction to win-lose games
We now describe a mapping from a general 2-player game to a win-lose game so that approximately well supported
equilibria of the win-lose game can be mapped to approximately well supported equilibria of the original game. Let us
introduce a bit of notation first. If A is an n× nmatrix with entries in [0, 1], we denote by round(A) the 0/1 matrix defined
as follows, for all i, j ∈ [n],
round(A)ij =
{
1, if Aij ≥ 12
0, if Aij < 12 .
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The following lemma establishes a useful connection between approximately well supported equilibria of the 0/1 game
and approximately well supported equilibria of the original game.
Lemma 4.6. If (x, y) is an -approximately well supported Nash equilibrium of the game (round(R), round(C)), then (x, y) is a
1+
2 -approximately well supported Nash equilibrium of the game (R, C).
Proof. Wewill show that x is approximately well supported against y in the game (R, C); similar arguments apply to justify
that y is approximately well supported. Let us denote R′ = round(R) and C ′ = round(C).
The following claim follows easily from the rounding procedure.
Claim 1. ∀i, j ∈ [n] : R
′
ij
2 ≤ Rij ≤ 12 +
R′ij
2
It follows that for all i ∈ [n],
1
2
eTi R
′y ≤ eTi Ry ≤
1
2
+ 1
2
eTi R
′y. (1)
We will use (1) to argue that x is approximately well supported. Indeed, ∀k ∈ supp(x), and ∀i ∈ [n]
eTi Ry− eTkRy ≤
1
2
+ 1
2
eTi R
′y− 1
2
eTkR
′y ≤ 1
2
+ 1
2
· (eTi R′y− eTkR′y) ≤
1
2
+ 1
2
· 
where the last implication follows from the fact that (x, y) is an -approximately well supported Nash equilibrium of the
game (R′, C ′). 
4.3. Finding well supported equilibria
Lemmas 4.3 through 4.6 suggest the following algorithm, ALG-WS, to compute approximately well supported Nash
equilibria of a given two player game (R, C):
(1) Map the game (R, C) to the win-lose game (round(R), round(C)).
(2) Map game (round(R), round(C)) to the game (round(R)f , round(C)f ), where f is any
best response mapping for the column player.
(3) Find a subset S ⊆ [n] and a strategy y ∈ ∆(S) for the column player such that all the
strategies in S are |S|−1|S| -well supported for the row player in (round(R)
f , round(C)f )
against the strategy y for the column player.
(4) By a successive application of Lemmas 4.4–4.6, we get an
(
1
2 + 12 |S|−1|S|
)
=(
1− 12|S|
)
-approximately well supported Nash equilibrium of the original game.
The only non-trivial step of the algorithm is step 3. Let us paraphrase what this task entails:
‘‘Given a 0/1 matrix round(R)f , find a subset of the columns S ⊆ [n] and a distribution
y ∈ ∆(S), so that all rows in S are |S|−1|S| -well supported against the distribution y over
the columns.’’
It is useful to consider the 0/1 matrix round(R)f as the adjacency matrix of a directed graph G on n vertices. We shall
argue, next, that the task above is easy in two cases: when G has a small cycle, and when G has a small undominated set of
vertices, that is a set of vertices such that no other vertex has edges to all of them.
(1) Suppose first that G has a cycle of length k, and let S be the set of vertices on the cycle. Then it is easy to see that all
the k strategies in S are k−1k -well supported for the row player against y, where y is the uniform strategy for the column
player over the set S. The reason is that each strategy in S has an expected payoff of at least 1k against y, and thus no
other strategy can dominate it by more than k−1k . This, via the above algorithm, implies a (1− 12k )-approximately well
supported Nash equilibrium.
(2) Second, suppose that there is a set S of ` undominated vertices. Then every strategy in S is (1 − 1
`
)-well supported
for the row player against the uniform strategy y of the column player over S, simply because there is no row that has
payoff better than 1− 1
`
against y. Again, via the algorithm, this implies that we can find a (1− 12` )-approximately well
supported Nash equilibrium.
This leads us to the following graph theoretic conjecture:
Conjecture 4.7. There are integers k and ` such that every digraph either has a cycle of length at most k or an undominated set
of ` vertices.
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Now, the next result follows immediately from the preceding discussion:
Theorem 4.8. If Conjecture 4.7 is true for some values of k and `, then Algorithm ALG-WS returns in polynomial time (e.g. by
exhaustive search) amax{1− 12k , 1− 12` }-approximately well supported Nash equilibrium which has support of sizemax{k, `}.
The statement of the conjecture is false for k = ` = 2, as can be seen by a small construction (with 7 vertices). The
statement for k = 3, ` = 2 is already non-trivial. In fact, it was stated as a conjecture by Myers [20] in relation to solving a
special case of the Caccetta–Häggkvist Conjecture [5]. However, it has recently been proved incorrect in [6] via an involved
construction. The case of a constant bound on k for ` = 2 has been left open.
While stronger forms of Conjecture 4.7 seem to be related to well-known and difficult graph theoretic conjectures, we
believe that the conjecture itself is true, and even that it holds for some small values of k and `, such as k = ` = 3.
What we can prove is the case of ` = log n, by showing that every digraph has a set of log n undominated vertices. This
gives a (1 − 12 log n )-approximately well supported Nash equilibrium, which does not seem to be easily obtained via other
arguments. We can also prove that the statement is true for k = 3, ` = 1 in the special case of tournament graphs; this
easily follows from the fact that every tournament is either transitive or contains a directed triangle.
5. Subsequent work and open problems
Since the first appearance of our results [9] there have been several improvements, achieving better approximation
guarantees for both the approximate Nash equilibrium and the approximatelywell supported Nash equilibrium.We provide
here a summary of the subsequent work, up until the publication of this article.
It was shown in [12] that there exist games in which no pair of strategies with supports of sublogarithmic size can
be an -approximate Nash equilibrium, for  < 1/2; the proof applies the probabilistic method on 1-sum games with
uniformly random 0/1matrices R. This result implies that our 12 -approximate Nash equilibrium algorithm is optimal among
the algorithms that only consider mixed strategies of sublogarithmic size support.
The first efficient algorithm for computing an -approximate Nash equilibrium of a two player game, for  < 1/2, was
given in [10], which achieved an approximation of  = (3 −√5)/2 ∼ 0.38. The techniques involved random sampling of
small support strategies and combining these with the solution to a certain linear program. This result was subsequently
improved in [2] to 0.36, while the current best approximation guarantee, given in [22], is 0.34. The latter result, which is
based on local search, establishes that any local minimum of a very natural map in the space of pairs of mixed strategies —
or its dual point in a certain minimax problem used for finding the local minimum — constitutes a 0.34-approximate Nash
equilibrium.
Regarding approximately well supported equilibria, [16] gave a polynomial time algorithm for computing a 0.658-Nash
equilibrium, using techniques similar to those presented here. However, while the result here is conditional on a graph
theoretic conjecture, the result in [16] is unconditional.
Despite the extensive research on the subject outlined above, it still remains open whether an -approximate Nash
equilibrium can be computed efficiently for arbitrarily small values of .1 Nevertheless, there are several positive results
for special cases. It is well-known, for example, that two-player zero-sum games (with R + C = 0) are solvable exactly
in polynomial time using Linear Programming [23,7,14]. In [17] a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) was
provided for a generalization of zero-sum games, called low-rank games; these are games in which R + C is a matrix of
fixed (constant) rank. Note that, if both R and C have fixed rank, there exists a Nash equilibrium with fixed support [18].
Hence, a Nash equilibrium can be computed exactly in polynomial time by enumerating all fixed size supports and using
Linear Programming to check if there is a Nash equilibrium consistent with a certain choice of supports.
In [11], a PTAS was provided for the class of 2-player large-support games. These are games with a Nash equilibrium in
which both players’ mixed strategies spread non-trivially (see [11] for the precise condition) over a linear size subset of the
pure strategies. This class of games is known to be PPAD-complete [8,3]. Another class of games which are PPAD-complete
to solve exactly, yet have a PTAS, is the class of bounded-norm games, in which every player’s payoff matrix is the sum of a
constant matrix and a matrix with bounded infinity norm. This class of games was shown to be PPAD-complete in [4], and
a PTAS was noted in [11].
It turns out that both the PTAS’s for large-support games and for bounded-norm games are of a very special kind, called
oblivious – where the approximate equilibrium is found by sampling a fixed universal distribution over pairs of mixed
strategies. Is there then an oblivious PTAS for the general case? In [11] it was shown that the answer is no, using a construction
similar to [1].
In view of the results described above, it was conjectured in [11] that an important step towards obtaining a polynomial-
time approximation scheme for general two-player games is to understand how an approximate Nash equilibrium can be
computed in the presence of an exact Nash equilibrium of logarithmic support.
1 Observe that, in view of Lemma 2.1, a polynomial-time approximation scheme for -approximate Nash equilibria would imply a polynomial-time
approximation scheme for -approximately well supported Nash equilibria.
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